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Introduction
In the last days of April 1975, U.S. citizen Bill Miner and his family fled
their seaside home near Saigon, South Vietnam to escape advancing
North Vietnamese Army units.' In their haste to leave, the Miners left
behind their house, beach villa, hotel, restaurant, shrimp farm, heavy
equipment company, a roomful of cash, and a fifty-six-foot yacht.2 The
Miners' property, valued at $1.2 million was, like all commercial enter-
prises in South Vietnam, subsequently seized by communist authorities
without compensation to the former owners.3
On February 3, 1994, President Clinton lifted the U.S. economic
embargo on Vietnam. 4 This decision accelerated the prospects for rapid
normalization of relations between the two countries. While the termina-
tion of the embargo was clearly the most important prerequisite to
improved relations between the United States and Vietnam, several issues
will influence the pace and scope of normalization.5 For example, contin-
ued progress in the resolution of remaining Prisoner-of-War/Missing-in-
Action (POW/MIA) cases and improvement in Vietnam's domestic
human rights record are crucial if full diplomatic relations are to be
established.6
1. Vietnam Legal Battle Looms; Americans Want Payments for Propety, ST. Louis Posr
DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 1994, at 1A.
2. Id.
3. See Claim of Betty Janet Mitchell, Claim No. V-0358, Dec. No. V-0259, at 2-3
(FCSC Mar. 11, 1985); see also J. Jeffrey Brown, Note, The Jurisprudence of the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission: Vi tnam Claims, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 99, 100 & n.5 (1986)
(citing Communique No. 3 of the Saigon-Gia Dinh City Military Management Commit-
tee, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Asia and Pacific (NTIS) Ir 2 ,
L-3 (May 1, 1975); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
4. Douglas Jehl, Opening to Vietnam: Clinton Drops 19-Year Ban on U.S. Trade with
Vietnam, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1994, at Al.
5. See generally U.S. Relations With Vietnam: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on East Asian
and Pacific Affairs of the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testi-
mony of Winston Lord, Asst. Sec. State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Depart-
ment of State) [hereinafter Lord Testimony].
6. See id. Assistant Secretary of State Lord testified in the Senate as to the signifi-
cance of lifting the embargo in relation to the process of establishing normal diplo-
matic relations with Vietnam:
The steps we have taken [in lifting the embargo] do not represent full nor-
malization of relations with Vietnam. We are not opening embassies or
exchanging ambassadors. We are not granting Vietnam special economic privi-
leges. We retain considerable political and economic incentives to ensure that
the government of Vietnam does not waiver from its commitment to continue
its cooperation on POW/MIA issues .... [Lifting the embargo] will also serve
to expand our dialogue with Vietnam on many issues, including human rights
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Another significant obstacle to normalized relations was the claims of
U.S. corporations and citizens, like Bill Miner and his family, whose prop-
erty was seized by Communist authorities when South Vietnam was over-
run by North Vietnamese forces in April 1975.7 Consequently, the Clinton
Administration, shortly after lifting the trade embargo in February 1994,
sent a negotiating team to Hanoi to begin discussions on Vietnam's pay-
ment of $200 million in U.S. claims. 8 Almost a year later, the United
States and Vietnam announced that Vietnam had promised to pay the full
value of the claims, totalling $208.5 million, as part of a wider agreement
establishing diplomatic liaison offices in Hanoi and in Washington and
including a promise that the United States would unfreeze Vietnamese
assets held by U.S. banks since 1975. 9
Part I of this Note reviews the impediments to normalization of rela-
tions between the United States and Vietnam, which for two decades pre-
cluded resolution of the claims of U.S. citizens for expropriated property.
These impediments included the U.S. economic embargo, the POW/MIA
issue, military cooperation between Vietnam and the former Soviet Union,
human rights abuses, and Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. Part II
summarizes the principles of international law regarding compensation
for expropriated or seized property of foreign nationals and foreign cor-
porations, including the ongoing debate over whether "full" compensa-
tion is required in every instance of nationalization or expropriation. Part
III examines the history, organization, and jurisprudence of the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), an important component of the
U.S. claims settlement process. Part IV reviews the FCSC's Vietnam Claims
Program, including the size and nature of the private claims against Viet-
nam, the eligibility requirements of claimants, the FCSC's definition of
"property," and the valuation techniques utilized in assessing awards.
Finally, part V examines the traditional use of "lump-sum" settlement
agreements by the U.S. government to obtain monetary satisfaction of
American claims.
.... The vastly increased numbers of American visitors, tourists, business peo-
ple, and other private groups who will now spread out across Vietnam, should
produce greater openness, greater contacts, greater information on our MIAs
and concrete results.
7. See discussion infra part IV.
8. U.S. Delegates to Visit Vienam, Cambodia, RxuTs, Feb. 22, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. The initial negotiating team was led by James Hall,
Director of the Office of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia Affhirs, and Ronald Bettauer,
Assistant Legal Advisor, both from the Department of State. The delegation also
included officials from the Departments ofJustice and Treasury. 1d.
9. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. and Vietnam Plan to Exchange Lvo-Level Envoys, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1994, at Al.
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I. Historical Background
A. Impediments to Resolution of Expropriation Claims
1. The POW/MIA Issue
The Paris Peace Accords10 ofJanuary 1973 formally ended direct U.S. mili-
tary involvement in the Vietnam conflict. When South Vietnam (the
Republic of Vietnam) fell to North Vietnamese forces on May 1, 1975,11
the United States refused to recognize North Vietnam (the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam) as the legitimate government in the area of South
Vietnam, and it extended trade and diplomatic sanctions already in place
against North Vietnam to all of Vietnam. 12 Several additional develop-
ments contributed to the continuation of the U.S. embargo for the next
nineteen years. First and foremost was the lack of cooperation from Viet-
nam in resolving the fate of American POW/MIAs. During the course of
the Vietnam War, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in Vietnam and
Pathet Lao guerrillas in Laos took more than 600 U.S. servicemen as "pris-
oners of war" (POWs).' 3 By the end of the conflict, over 1,276 additional
servicemen were reported as "missing-in-action" (MIA) in Southeast Asia,
and approximately 1,118 servicemen were listed as "killed-in-action" with
their "bodies not recovered" (KIA-BNR).14
Although North Vietnam was a signatory to the Third Geneva Con-
vention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War,1 5 it failed to observe many
of the Convention's most important provisions. For example, North Viet-
nam tortured and killed U.S. POWs in violation of article 70, publicly dis-
played and humiliated them in violation of article 71, failed to report their
names in violation of article 122, and denied them the right to exchange
10. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, Jan. 27, 1973,
24 U.S.T. 1, 935 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter Paris Peace Accords]. The Treaty also con-
tained four protocols including a Protocol on Prisoners and Detainees. On the military
side, the agreement provided for an immediate cease-fire (art. 2), the withdrawal of all
U.S. forces from South Vietnam within 60 days (art. 5), the return of military and civil-
ian POWs held by all sides within 60 days (art. 8), and a prohibition on the introduction
of troops, military advisers, or personnel into South Vietnam except to replace dam-
aged or destroyed equipment (art. 7).
With respect to political issues, the Treaty provided for the exercise of the right of
self-determination by the South Vietnamese people (art. 9), the formation by the Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG or Viet
Gong) and the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam (South Vietnam) of a National
Council of National Reconciliation and Concord to organize free and democratic elec-
tions (art. 12), the reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means (art. 15), and a U.S.
commitment to contribute to the post-war reconstruction of Indochina, including Viet-
nam (art. 21).
11. GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERIcA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNiTED STATES AND VIET-
NAM, 1950-1975, at 261 (1979).
12. See discussion infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
13. POW/MIA's: REPORT OF THE SELEcT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAiRs, S. REP.
No. 1, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1993) [hereinafter SELECr CoMMrrrEE REPORT].
14. Id. at 144-45.
15. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third
Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW
Convention].
Vol 28
1995 Satisfaction of Claims Against Vietnam
letters or receive visits from international humanitarian agencies (such as
the Red Cross) in violation of article 125.16 Several years of intense inter-
national, diplomatic, and media pressure between 1965 and 1969 eventu-
ally convinced the Communist leaders in Hanoi to release what turned out
to be partial lists of the names of the POWs they were holding.' 7
With the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in January 1973,
North Vietnam and the Viet Cong agreed to return within sixty days all
591 American POWs they claimed to be holding.18 North Vietnam and
the Viet Cong also agreed to cooperate in resolving the fates of remaining
MIAs and to assist in retrieving the remains of KIAs whose bodies had not
already been recovered.' 9 In return, the United States agreed to withdraw
virtually all its military personnel from South Vietnam and pledged to pro-
vide financial assistance for post-war reconstruction.2 0 In a secret letter
from President Richard Nixon to North Vietnam President Pham Van
Dong dated February 1, 1973 (four days after the signing of the Paris
Peace Accords), Nixon proposed to recommend to Congress an appropri-
ation of $3.25 billion in reconstruction aid and $1.0-1.5 billion in other
forms of aid.2 1
U.S. officials were disappointed that more live American prisoners
were not included on the lists of those to be returned.22 Officials were
particularly disappointed that only ten Americans lost or captured in Laos
would be returned.2 3 U.S. records showed that 352 military men were
listed as POW or MIA in Laos, and top military and intelligence officials
had hoped that as many as forty-one servicemen lost in Laos would be
returned as prisoners.2 4 Government officials had also hoped that an
additional eighty or so Americans believed captured in North and South
Vietnam would be returned.2
16. For documentation of North Vietnam's violations of the POW Convention, see,
e.g., EVER=r ALVAZ, CHAINED EAGLE (1989); ScoTr BLAxEy, PRISONER AT WAR: THE
SURVIVAL OF COMMANDER RICHARD A. STRATTON (1978); LARRY GUAINO, A POWs
STORY. 2801 DAYS IN HANOI (1990); CRAIG HowEs, VoicEs OF THE VIrTNAM POWs: WIT-
NESSES TO THEIR FIGHT (1993);JOHN G. HURBELL, POW: A DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PMSONER-OF-WAR EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM, 1964-1973 (1976); SAM JOHNSON,
CAPrIE WAmoIRs: A VIETNAM POWs STORY (1992); MALCOLM McCoNNELL, INTO THE
MOUTH OF THE CAT THE STORY OF LANCE SUAN, HERO OF Vm-rNAM (1985); WINNiE
WAGAMAN, CIVILIAN POW: TERROR AND TORTURE IN SOUTH VETNAM (1989).
17. SELECT COMMITTE REPORT, supra note 13, at 141-42.
18. Paris Peace Accords, supra note 10, art. 8, Protocol on Prisoners and Detainees.
19. Id.
20. Id. art. 21. Article 21 of the Accords provides:
The United States anticipates that this agreement will usher in an era of recon-
ciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of
Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional role, the United States will contrib-
ute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.
Id.
21. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 74-75.
22. Id. at 82, 147-48.
23. Id. at 82-83.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 145.
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By late 1973 it was clear that Congress would never appropriate the
$3.25 billion in reconstruction aid which Nixon had pledged. Conse-
quently, cooperation from North Vietnam on the POW/MIA issue dwin-
dled and, by early 1974, had virtually ceased. 26 North Vietnam's
subsequent full-scale invasion of South Vietnam in early 1975, and the
rapid collapse of Saigon in April 1975, ended all hopes for an accounting
of American POW/MIAs under the framework of the Paris Peace
Accords. 27
Widespread post-war speculation about the possibility of American
POWs still being held in Vietnam helped scuttle any hopes of U.S.-
Vietnamese reconciliation and an end to the economic embargo. For
example, in May 1981, the Washington Post reported that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) had mounted an operation in Laos to verify the
detainment of twenty to forty American POWs in a prison camp.28 In the
late 1980s, magazines and newspapers published several photos purport-
ediy depicting American POWs still held in captivity in Southeast Asia.
Although the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency proved that the most infa-
mous POW photos, published on the cover of Time magazine in 1991, had
been clipped from old Soviet magazines, the POW controversy contin-
ued.29 Thousands of "live sighting reports" of American POWs by
Vietnamese refugees fueled further allegations of a U.S. government
coverup even though virtually all of these reports were determined to be
fabrications, correlated to returned POWs, or correlated to non-POWs.
30
Despite repeated public assurances from U.S. government officials
that there was "no credible evidence" that Americans were being held
against their will in Southeast Asia, polls in the late 1980s indicated that a
majority of the American people believed American POWs still remained
alive in Vietnam. 31 Several books were also published alleging that Ameri-
can POWs were left in Southeast Asia.32 This public perception made it
politically impossible for Presidents Reagan and Bush to lift the economic
embargo and precluded any meaningful discussion of the issue of com-
pensation for claims of U.S. nationals against Vietnam for expropriated
property.
2. Vietnam's Military Cooperation with the Soviet Union
Vietnam's close relationship with the former Soviet Union after the fall of
Saigon and throughout the 1980s also prevented any rapprochement
26. Id. at 110, 371-72.
27. Id. at 153.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 322-24.
30. Id. at 178.
31. Id. at iii.
32. See, e.g., NIGEL CAWrHORNE, THE BAMBOO CAGE (1991); MONIKAJENSEN-STEVEN.
SON, KISS THE Boys GOODBYE: How THE UNITED STATES BETRAYED ITS OWN POWs IN
VIETNAM (1990); MARK SAUTER, THE MEN WE LzFr BEHIND: HENRY KISSINGER, THE POLI.
TICs OF DECEIT AND THE TRAGIC FATE OF POWs AFrR THE VIETNAM WAR (1993).
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between the United States and Vietnam.3 3 Large-scale Soviet military, eco-
nomic, and political assistance to Vietnam during and after the Vietnam
War culminated in a 1984 treaty which formalized the alliance between
the two nations.s In return for its political, economic, and military sup-
port of Vietnam during and after the Vietnam War,35 the Soviet Union
gained access to Vietnam's U.S.-built modem naval port facilities at Cam
Ranh Bay.36 Additionally, Soviet military assistance in the years following
the Vietnam War enabled Vietnam to maintain a 1.1 million-man army
and a foreign occupation force numbering 200,000 troops in Laos and
Cambodia.3 7 In the context of the bipolar, Cold War climate of the 1980s,
close military cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union pre-
cluded any reconciliation between Vietnam and the United States.
3. Vetnam's Invasion of Neighboring Cambodia
Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 and occupied its smaller neighbor
throughout the 1980s. This action further stymied any hopes for
improved relations with the United States.3 8 Vietnam justified its actions
in Cambodia on two grounds while alluding to a third. First, it claimed
that Khmer Rouge attacks across the Vietnamese border in 1978 justified
the invasion. Second, it claimed that the People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK), installed by Vietnamese forces two weeks after the invasion, had
requested the Vietnamese troops to remain. Finally, Vietnam alluded to
humanitarian reasons for its intervention, citing the genocide of the
Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot.3 9 Many nations initially applauded the inva-
sion as a humanitarian effort to topple the barbarous Khmer Rouge, who
were responsible for the deaths of as many as two million Cambodians.
Eventually, however, some states saw the continued occupation of Cambo-
dia by 150,000 or more Vietnamese troops as an attempt at renewed
33. For analysis of the U.S.S.R.-Vietnam relationship, see generally ROBERT N.
BOUDREAU, VIETNAM AND THE SovIEr UNION: IMPICATIONS FOR EUROPE AND AMERIcAN
FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS (1983); ADAM FFORDE, ECONOMIc ASPECTS OF THE SOvIEr-
VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIP (1984); DOUGLAS E. PIKE, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE USSR AND
VIETNAM (1984).
34. U.S.S.R.-Vietnam: Agreement on Long-Term Program for the Development of
Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, 23 I.L.M. 659 (1984). Vietnam and
the Soviet Union had concluded a Treaty of Friendship & Cooperation in 1978, which
clearly tied their security interests. BOUDREAU, supra note 33, at 23.
35. According to one authoritative study, Soviet economic and military assistance to
Vietnam during the period 1975-1981 reached almost $9 billion. BOUDREAU, supra note
33, at 48.
36. Id. The reported price to the Soviet Union of unrestricted access to Cam Ranh
Bay and three other U.S.-built bases was a doubling of daily economic aid to Vietnam
from $3 million dollars to $6 million dollars. Id.
37. Id. at 55. It is estimated that Soviet troop levels in Vietnam numbered at least
5,000 during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Id. at 55-56.
38. See generally Cambodia After 5 years of retnamese Occupation: Hearing and Markup
on H. Con. Res. 176 Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
39. See GARY J. KUrNTWORTH, VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 10-11 (1989).
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Vietnamese hegemony in Southeast Asia.40 By the late 1980s, many
nations had begun to provide arms, money, sanctuary, and political and
moral support to one or more of the resistance forces fighting the
Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government.
41
4. Human Rights Abuses in Vietnam
Finally, widespread human rights abuses in Vietnam contributed to contin-
ued poor relations between the United States and Vietnam through the
1970s and 1980s.4 2 Former South Vietnamese military and government
officials were persecuted by the victorious North Vietnamese government,
and tens of thousands spent many years in brutal "re-education camps."
45
The estimated 50,000-200,000 individuals sent to "re-education camps"
after the fall of Saigon generally fell into one of four categories: (1)
officers and NCO's of the former South Vietnamese police or military, (2)
civil servants of the former South Vietnamese government under Prime
Minister Thieu, (3) members of "reactionary" (i.e., democratic) political
parties, or (4) professionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, and
professors.4 4
Other human rights concerns in Vietnam included government cen-
sorship of the media and the institution of a one-party political system
totally intolerant of any political dissent or criticism.
45
5. The Economic Embargo Against Vienam, 1975-1994
As a result of Vietnam's recalcitrance on the POW/MIA issue, its close
alliance with the Soviet Union, its invasion and occupation of Cambodia,
and its dismal human rights record, the United States maintained the war-
time economic embargo against Vietnam throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
The embargo imposed extremely detailed and comprehensive restrictions
on trade and other economic activity related to Vietnam. The most impor-
tant restrictions prohibited the export to Vietnam of all but humanitarian
commodities,46 the import of all Vietnamese commodities into the United
States,4 7 the purchasing of Vietnamese merchandise by persons within the
United States, the selling or arranging to purchase or sell in a foreign
40. Id. at 3, 7-10.
41. Id. at 3.
42. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, 95TH CONG., lsr SESS., THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
AND THE U.S. RESPONSE 74-76 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter STATUS OF HUMAN
RIGHTs].
43. Conversations between the author and several former "re-education camp"
inmates in Ho Chi Minh City in April 1992 revealed that many of them had been held
in the camps for ten years or more depending on their former positions in the South
Vietnamese government and their willingness to cooperate with the North Vietnamese
regime.
44. STATUS OF HuMAN RGHTS, supra note 42, at 75-76.
45. Id.
46. 15 C.F.R. § 785.1(a) (ii) (1994) (provision deleted at 59 Fed. Reg. 6524 (1994)).
47. 31 C.F.R. § 500.204 (1994).
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country any merchandise to Vietnam,48 the movement of U.S. docu-
mented ships and planes to Vietnam,49 and the transportation of goods
known to be destined for Vietnam in U.S. documented planes or ships.50
The trade restrictions precluded virtually all business dealings
between U.S. corporations or carriers and the Socialist Republic of Viet-
nam. Additionally, many Western nations, which might otherwise have
provided Vietnam with badly needed economic assistance, were deterred
from doing so by the U.S. embargo.5' The embargo drastically affected
the post-war recovery of Vietnam by denying access to technology needed
to modernize its infrastructure, develop its manufacturing base, and
exploit its agricultural potential.52 The combination of the U.S. embargo,
the collectivization of agriculture in the former South Vietnam, and the
disincentives and inefficiencies of the centrally-planned economy imposed
on the area of South Vietnam after the war, caused economic production
in Vietnam to stagnate in the late 1970s and 1980s.
5 3
Perhaps the most severe problem for the post-war Vietnamese econ-
omy was hyperinflation as annual rates generally exceeded 100% and even
topped 400% in 1985 and 1 9 8 6 .54 As a result of such inflation and other
economic weaknesses, Vietnam's standard of living dropped to among the
lowest in the world in the 1980s with a gross national product per capita of
approximately $200.5 5
U.S. corporations also suffered as a result of the embargo. They were
48. 31 C.F.R. § 505.10 (1994).
49. 44 C.F.R. § 403.1 (1993) (provision deleted at 59 Fed. Reg. 8412 (1994)).
50. 44 C.F.R. § 403.2 (1993) (provision deleted at 59 Fed. Reg. 8412 (1994)).
51. W. Gary Vause, Doing Business with Vienam-Prospects and Concerns for the 1990s, 4
FLA. INT'L LJ. 231, 251 n.123 (1989). One expert has concluded that "so long as [Viet-
nam was] the target of an embargo by the United States, trade and investment with
Vietnam by the West [was] stymied." Id. at 287. By contrast, other commentators down-
play the influence of the embargo on United States allies, such as Japan, who desire
trade relations with Vietnam. As of January 1992 there were at least 75 small Japan-
Vietnam joint ventures averaging around $1 million of investment each. Therefore,
limits on investment by various countries may have been more a result of impediments
within Vietnam rather than the effect of the U.S. embargo. See Douglas Pike, Creeping
Toward Relations in Southeast Asia, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at 26.
52. See Mya Than & Joseph L.H. Tan, The Vrienamese Economy in Transition, in VIET-
NAM'S DILEMMAS AND OPTIONS: THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN THE 1990S
1-4 (Mya Than &Joseph L.H. Tan eds., 1993).
53. SeeJoEL CHANEY, OBSrACLES TO RECOVERY IN VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHEA: U.S.
EMBARGO OF HUMANITARIAN AID 127 (1984). See genera/!y ADAM FFORDE, THE LIMrrs OF
NATIONAL LIBERATION: PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLC OF VIETNAM (1987); ADAM FFORDE, VIEmNAM, AN ECONOMY IN TRANSION
(1988); THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM IN AN ASIAN PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE
(Tran Van Tho ed., 1990); DANG T. TRAN, SOCIALIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM rN VIET NAM (1991); HOANG K. TRAN, ECONOMY OF
VIETNAM: REVIEWS AND STATISTICS (1992); YUANGRAT WEDEL, CuRRENT VIETNAMESE
ECONOMY (1989).
54. Than & Tan, supra note 52, at 4-5.
55. Id. at 31. See also Vetnam's Transition to a Market Economy: Reform Priorities-For-
eign Direct Investmen4 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Dec. 1993, at 9 [hereinafter Vietnam ;
Transition].
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denied access to a rapidly growing export market of 70 million people,56 a
well-educated, highly-disciplined workforce,5 7 a potentially huge agricul-
tural sector,58 and abundant natural resources, including offshore depos-
its of oil and natural gas.59
While President Clinton's decision to lift the web of economic restric-
tions on trade and investment in Vietnam was the first step towards pros-
perous business relations, Vietnam is far from being an attractive locale for
U.S. corporations. For example, Vietnam is not a party to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and thus is not required to abide
by internationally agreed upon trade rules considered crucial by busi-
nesses to long-term profitable trade relations.60 Furthermore, the U.S.
and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) embargoes retarded
the development of Vietnamese bilateral and multilateral trade agree-
ments with Western nations and Vietnam's Asian neighbors alike. 61
Before U.S. corporations will invest heavily in Vietnamese industries, the
communist government in Hanoi must create a favorable investment and
business climate.62 Despite all the economic uncertainties, however, sev-
eral hundred foreign corporations have established operations in Vietnam
56. SeeJUDITH BANNISTER, ViEIrNAM POPULATION DYNAMics AND PROSPECTS xi (1993).
Vietnam is the world's thirteenth most populous nation.
57. Vause, supra note 51, at 231, 235. See also BANNiSTFR, supra note 56, at 47-51.
58. ArthurJ. Dommen, Potential for Foreign Investors in Vietnam's Agricultural Sector, E.
AsiAN EXEC. REP., July 1992, at 20.
59. Michael J. Scown, Investing in Vietnam: Oil and Gas Exploration, E. AsiAN. ExEc.
REP., Apr. 1992, at 23, 24. Vietnam's petroleum reserves are estimated at nearly 1.5 to
3.0 billion barrels (more than either Australia or Malaysia), and its offshore gas reserves
may be as high as 10 trillion cubic feet. Id.
60. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. AS, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu.
MENTS, 4th Supp. 1 (1969).
61. Vause, supra note 51, at 251.
62. In recent years, Vietnam has taken significant steps to improve the potential for
successful foreign investment. The most significant step was the 1988 Foreign Invest-
ment Law which expanded Vietnam's potential for economic cooperation with other
nations, promoted domestic economic development through increased exports and
exploitation of natural resources, and encouraged broad foreign investment though
business cooperation contracts, joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
Vause, supra note 51, at 237 & n.28 (citing Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam,Jan.
1, 1988, English translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Southeast Asia,
Jan. 12, 1988, at 47); see also Vause, supra note 51, at 254-55; Than & Tan, supra note 52,
at 7.
Additional regulations supplementing the 1988 Foreign Investment Law have been
promulgated almost continuously since 1988 in order to clarify ambiguities and address
important issues omitted in the original law. See, e.g., Decree of the Council of Ministers
Regulating in Detail the Implementation of the Law of Foreign Investment in Vietnam,
(No. 139/HDBT), Sept. 5, 1988, English translation in E. ASIAN EXEC. REP.,June 1989,
at 25, 30. Issues addressed in the implementing regulations included contractual busi-
ness cooperation,joint ventures, enterprises with 100% foreign capital, business organi-
zation, labor relations, financial matters, foreign exchange control, accounts and
audits, customs, immigration, residency, communications, and other issues. Vause,
supra note 51, at 225-31; see also Than & Tan, supra note 52, at 7.
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over the last several years.63
B. Prospects for Normalization of Relations
Over the last several years, changes in Vietnam and around the world cre-
ated a climate where the United States could finally consider lifting the
economic embargo and move toward normalization of relations. First, the
drastic curtailment of Soviet military activity and support in Vietnam in the
late 1980s, 64 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, permitted the
United States to look at its relations with Vietnam in a post-Cold War per-
spective. Second, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in
1990-91, and their replacement with a U.N. peacekeeping force, removed
another significant obstacle to improved relations between the former
adversaries. 65 Third, respect for human rights improved in Vietnam over
the last several years as thousands of former South Vietnamese govern-
ment officials, who were jailed or sent to re-education camps for several
years after the fall of Saigon, were finally released and sometimes permit-
ted to emigrate to the United States. 66
Most importantly, a thorough U.S. Senate investigation and greatly
increased cooperation from Vietnam on the issue of American POW/
MIAs persuaded the Senate to pass a nonbinding resolution on January
27, 1994, which called for President Clinton to lift the U.S. economic
embargo on Vietnam. 67 The Senate established a Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs in October 1991 to investigate the issue of possible
POWs in Vietnam as well as the U.S. government's handling of the issue.
63. As a result of the codification and continued clarification of its liberal direct
foreign investment laws, approved foreign investment in Vietnam rose steadily from 37
projects totaling $364 million in 1988 to over 200 projects totalling $1.551 billion in
1991. Vtetnam's Transition, supra note 55, at 8-11. From 1988 through 1994, more than
1,000 direct foreign investment projects in Vietnam had been approved totalling over
$10 billion. Jonathan L. Golin, Tiger by the Tai, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1995, at 62. Oil and gas
exploration and tourism are the most active foreign investment sectors, and Taiwan
($785 million), Hong Kong ($597 million), France ($453 million), and Australia ($308
million) are the four largest investors. Two-thirds of the foreign investment projects are
in the former South Vietnam where the infrastructure is more developed, western busi-
ness practices are better understood, and management skills appropriate to a market
economy are in greater supply. Of the three types of direct foreign investment permit-
ted in Vietnam-business cooperation contract, Vietnamese-foreign joint venture, or
wholly foreign-owned enterprise-joint ventures have constituted a majority of the
projects to date. Vietnam's Transition, supra note 55, at 9-11.
64. See Leszek Buszymski, The Soviet Union and Vetnamese Withdrawal from Cambodia,
in VIETNAM'S WITHDRAvAL. FROM CAMBODIA 46 (Gary Klintworth ed., 1990).
65. See Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations in Cambodia: A Model for Resolution of
Internal Conflict? in ENFORCING RESTRAINT, COLLECrIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CON-
FUCrs 241-73 (Lori Fisher & Dan Rosen eds., 1993).
66. Human Rights in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Naws FROM ASIA WATCH (Asia Watch,
New York, N.Y.), Aug. 17, 1993, at 2. This is not to say that human rights conditions in
Vietnam are good. Individuals are still detained for political dissent. Freedom of reli-
gion is denied and prison conditions are deplorable. Id. at 2-10.
67. Chronology of U.S.-Vietnam Trade Relations, Trade Embargo, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curavs File. The vote in the Senate was 62-38 in favor
of the resolution. Id.
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The Select Committee was comprised of twelve Senators and a profes-
sional staff of approximately fifteen individuals. Over a fifteen month
period, the Select Committee deposed hundreds of witnesses, reviewed
hundreds of thousands of documents, and examined all conceivably rele-
vant POW/MIA intelligence. Members of the Select Committee also made
several trips to Southeast Asia and held seventeen days of public hearings
in Washington, D.C.68
The Select Committee's conclusions were recorded in a 500 page
Final Report issued in January 1993.69 The Select Committee concluded
that "[w]hile the Committee has some evidence suggesting the possibility a
POW may have survived to the present.., there is, at this time, no compel-
ling evidence that proves that any American remains alive in captivity in
Southeast Asia." 70 The Select Committee also emphatically rejected the
contentions that U.S. government officials either knowingly abandoned
American POWs in Southeast Asia or conspired or attempted to suppress
information showing the existence of American POWs alive in Vietnam
after the war.7 1 The Select Committee Report left little doubt, however,
that Vietnam withheld much available information on the fate of Ameri-
can POWs for over fifteen years after the fall of Saigon.72
Cooperation from the Vietnamese on the POW/MIA issue increased
substantially during the four or five years before the embargo was lifted.
For example, between 1988 and 1993 the Vietnamese returned 112 sets of
remains identified as Americans and allowed the Unites States to establish
a POW/MIA Office in Hanoi in April 1991 to help coordinate POW/MIA
search efforts. 73 In the last two years alone, Vietnam has permitted the
United States to conduct several dozen wartime crash site investigations
and excavations throughout the Vietnamese countryside. These investiga-
tions and excavations take several weeks and involve dozens of American
military and civilian remains recovery personnel from the Joint Task Force
for Full Accounting (JTF-FA), established in late 1991 to take advantage of
increased U.S. access to crash sites in Vietnam. 74
As a result of this progress, in July 1993, the Clinton Administration
dropped U.S. opposition to World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) lending to Vietnam, and in September 1993, it announced that U.S.
companies could bid for contracts in Vietnam financed by such World
Bank or IMF loans.75
Finally, on February 3, 1994, President Clinton announced the termi-
nation of the U.S. economic embargo against Vietnam, effective immedi-
68. SELECt CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 13, at iii.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 7, 10.
72. Id. at 389.
73. Id. at 47.
74. Lord Testimny, supra note 5.
75. Id.
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ately.76 Companies no longer needed to seek approval from the U.S.
Department of Commerce to conduct trade with Vietnam or make invest-
ments in Vietnamese industries. Within months of the announcement,
several U.S. corporations, including Motorola, Caterpillar, Pepsi, Mobil,
Coca-Cola, Proctor & Gamble, American Express, IBM, Ford, Chrysler,
Otis Elevator, and General Motors had announced plans for major joint
ventures or investments in Vietnam.77 Several U.S. law firms promptly
established offices in Vietnam to handle the legal work accompanying the
expected rush of business investments. 78 President Clinton's decision to
lift the embargo meant that the only remaining hurdle on the path to
normalized relations was the issue of compensation of U.S. corporations
and individuals for property seized by Communist authorities after the fall
of South Vietnam in 1975.
II. International Law of Compensation for Seized Property
A widely accepted principle of international law is that the taking of the
property of an alien, unless accompanied by compensation, is illegal.79
According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, just compensation "must, in the absence of exceptional cir-
cumstances, be in an amount equivalent to the value of the property
taken."8 0 The Restatement restricts "exceptional circumstances" by
76. Remarks Announcing the End of the Trade Embargo on Vietnam, 30 WEKxLY
COMP. Pm. Doc. 205 (Feb. 7, 1994).
77. Louis Beckerling, Vietnam-The Second U.S. Invasion, STRAnS TAMES, Feb. 20,
1994, at 1; Colin, supra note 63, at 64; Harish Mehta, Big Wheels Start Rollin' in Vietnami,
Bus. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at 15; Harish Mehta, The Second American Wave Hits Vietnam,
Bus. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1994, at 15; Harish Mehta, U.S. FirmsFlood Vienam with Infrastructure
Bids, Bus. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at 3.
78. Golin, supra note 63, at 63. Law firms which have already established offices in
Vietnam include Baker & McKenzie; Paul, Weiss, Rifldnd, Wharton & Garrison; White
& Case; Coudert Brothers; Russi & Vecchi; and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.
Id.
79. RESTATFEENT (THmD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 712(1) (1987):
State Responsibility for Economic Injury to Nationals of Other States
A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from:
(1) taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that
(a) is not for a public purpose, or
(b) is discriminatory, or
(c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation.
For compensation to be just under this subsection, it must, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, be in an amount equivalent to the value of the prop-
erty taken and be paid at the time of taking, or within a reasonable time there-
after with interest from the date of taking, and in a form economically usable by
the foreign national;
Id See generaly S. FiEMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1953).
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIED STATES
§ 712(1) (1987). The Comments to the Restatement note that, "In exceptional circum-
stances, some deviation from the standard of equivalent value compensation... might
satisfy the requirement of just compensation. Whether circumstances are so excep-
tional as to warrant such deviation, and whether in the circumstances the particular
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delineating four characteristics of an expropriation which is not exempt
from the general requirement of equivalent value compensation:
A departure from the general rule on the ground of such exceptional cir-
cumstances is unwarranted if (i) the property taken had been used in a
business enterprise that was specifically authorized or encouraged by the
state; (ii) the property was an enterprise taken for operation by the state as
a going concern by the state; (iii) the taking program did not apply equally
to nationals of the taking state; or (iv) the taking itself was otherwise wrong-
ful under Subsection (a) or (b).81
The Reporter's Notes, following the Comments, clarify that nationaliza-
tions of investments in natural resources or of going business concerns,
which would generate funds from which compensation could be paid,
would not constitute "exceptional circumstances" permitting other than
full compensation. 82
The United States and many other countries maintain that a state
which takes alien property must provide "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation. 83 Many nations, however, particularly in Latin America
and elsewhere in the Third World, have contested the traditional view that
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation requires "full" or
"equivalent value" compensation." After the large-scale nationalizations
by the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, some Western com-
mentators adopted more liberal views on the appropriate compensation
standard.85 The development of more flexible views on just compensation
was furthered by the policies of communist and developing countries, who
deviation satisfies the requirement ofjust compensation, are questions of international
law...." Id. at cMt. d.
81. Id.
82. Id. at rep. note 3.
83. Id. at cmt. c. President Ronald Reagan reiterated the traditional U.S. position
in a 1983 policy statement:
Under international law, no U.S. investment should be expropriated unless the
taking (a) is done for a public purpose; (b) is accomplished under due process
of law; (c) is non-discriminatory; (d) does not violate any previous contractual
arrangements between the national or company concerned and the govern-
ment making the expropriation; (e) is accompanied by prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation.
Statement of President Ronald Reagan, 19 WEEIKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1216-18 (Sept. 9,
1983).
84. See, e.g., Francisco Orrego Vicuna, The International Regulation of Valuation Stan-
dards and Processes: A Reexamination of Third World Perspectives in 3 THE VALUATION OF
NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 131-48 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1975);
Brice M. Clagett, The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Is
:rust Compensation" Required by International Law or Not?, 16 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 813,
876-84 (1984). The traditional view, requiring full (equivalent value) compensation,
was originally established in two decisions of the Permanent Court of International jus-
tice in the 1920s. See Factory at Chorzow, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17; Case Concerning
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 32.
85. C.F. Amerasinghe, Issues of Compensationfor the Taking of Alien Property in the Light
of Recent Cases and Practice, 41 INT'L & Com. L.Q. 22, 24 (1992). For examples of these
more liberal views, see Oscar Schachter, Compensation Cases-Leading and Misleading, 79
Am. J. INT'L L. 420 (1985); Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 Am. J.
INT'L L. 121 (1984); Burns H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
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argued that the appropriate compensation to be paid for expropriated
property should be determined strictly under the domestic laws of the
expropriating state.8 6 Not surprisingly, the traditional U.S. view has been
contested in the United Nations and other international organizations by
states which argue that "full" compensation is not required by interna-
tional law.87
A. The U.N. View of Compensation for Seized Property
The U.N. view with respect to the expropriation or seizure of alien prop-
erty is specifically addressed in two U.N. documents. First, in 1962, Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 1803, entitled Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources,8 8 affirmed that a taking of property of foreign nation-
als required compensation but declared only that the compensation had
to be "appropriate."
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds
or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recog-
nized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and
foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in
accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the
exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In any
case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the
national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted.
However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned,
settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or interna-
tional adjudication.8 9
The United States had proposed the phrase "prompt, adequate and effec-
tive" compensation rather than "appropriate," but it voted for the resolu-
tion while declaring that, in its view, the terms were synonymous.90
A second U.N. document concerning the issue of compensation for
expropriated property is General Assembly Resolution 3281, the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), article 2.2 (c).91 It was
adopted in 1974 by a vote of 120-6 (the six oppositions being the United
States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium,
Denmark, and Luxembourg) with ten abstentions. 92 CERDS provides that
and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437, 453-54 (1981); BA
WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 35 (1959).
86. Amerasinghe, supra note 85, at 24. This view requires examination of the taking
state's constitution and domestic laws of eminent domain and expropriation to deter-
mine what level of compensation, if any, is appropriate. Id. at 26-27.
87. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRImLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 838 (1991).
88. GA Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5344
(1962) [hereinafter GA Res. 1803]. Resolution 1803 passed by a vote of 87-2 with 12
abstentions, with the United States voting in favor. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note
87, at 838.
89. GA Res. 1803, supra note 88 (emphasis added).
90. U.N. Doc. A/C.2/S.R. 850, at 327 (1962).
91. GA. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974),
reprinted in 14 I.LM. 251, 255 (1975).
92. Amerasinghe, supra note 85, at 33 n.47.
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each state has the right
[t)o nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in
which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all cir-
cumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the ques-
tion of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the
domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely
and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance
with the principle of free choice of means. 93
While the earlier Resolution 1803 (of 1962) refers to international law and
seems to support the traditional view of compensation, the CERDS Resolu-
tion 3281 (of 1974) supports the view that full compensation is not
required by international law. CERDS abandoned the earlier U.N. state-
ment that "appropriate" compensation must be made "according to inter-
national law" in favor of the principle that compensation is to be
determined entirely under the domestic law of the host state. 94
B. What Constitutes "Appropriate" Compensation?
Several recent international arbitrations arising out of Libyan and Iranian
expropriations of foreign assets addressed the question of what constitutes
"appropriate" or "adequate" compensation. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribu-
nal consistently required "full" compensation, including lost profits when
appropriate, and nothing less.95 While the tribunal always awarded full
compensation, the judges occasionally adverted to the difference of opin-
ion as to whether less than full compensation could still be 'just" compen-
sation in the case of lawful nationalizations as opposed to discrete
expropriations.9 6
93. GA Res. 3281, supra note 91, at 255 (emphasis added).
94. Amerasinghe, supra note 85, at 34.
95. Id. at 42. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was established by the Algiers Accords,
which resulted in the release of 52 American hostages seized and held for 444 days in
the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, beginning in November 1979. Declaration of
the Government of the Democratic and Popular Government of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981,
20 I.L.M. 224 (1981); Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of
the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, 20
I.L.M. 229 (1981); Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19,
1981, 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981) [hereinafter Algiers Accords]. See generally ALLtwAva MAUiu,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE WORK OF THE IRAN-
U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1993).
96. The difference between nationalization and expropriation is subtle but signifi-
cant. In expropriations the state "takes possession of personal, individually held assets
and rights of foreigners and usually makes prompt and fair payment for them." Nation-
alization, by contrast, is a "general, impersonal form of expropriation which the state
uses in the larger interests of society to advance a program of economic and social
reforms. Its purpose is to have the ownership of wealth and natural resources, as well as
the means of production perform a social function." RENATO RIBEIRO, NATURALIZATION
OF FOREIGN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw i (1977).
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The decision by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in the SEDCO arbitra-
tion97 was a valuable precedent for those favoring "full" compensation. In
that case, SEDCO, Inc., an American company, sought full ("prompt, ade-
quate and effective") compensation for fran's seizure of SEDIRAN, an
ongoing business enterprise, under customary international law and the
Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States which required com-
pensation for the "full equivalent of the property taken."98 Iran argued
that "full" compensation had never been the standard under international
law and that customary international law required only "appropriate" com-
pensation in light of all the circumstances of the situation.
9 9
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal noted initially that the standard prior
to World War II clearly required compensation "equivalent to the full
value of the property taken."' 0 0 The Tribunal noted, however, that the
common practice of making lump-sum settlements in satisfaction of
expropriation claims and the U.N. resolutions discussed earlier have been
used as a basis by some nations for arguing that "full" compensation is no
longer the standard to be applied. 10 ' The Tribunal rejected fran's argu-
An example of the distinction between nationalization and expropriation was evident
in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal decision in INA Corporation Case, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Reo. 373, 378 (1985), where the tribunal awarded full compensation to the claimant
but noted that, "[i]n the event of such large-scale nationalizations of a lawful character,
international law has undergone a gradual reappraisal, the effect of which may be to
undermine the doctrinal value of any 'full' or 'adequate' (when used as identical to
'full') compensation standard as proposed in this case." The Chairman of the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal examined the debate and concluded that
an application of current principles of international law, as encapsulated in the
"appropriate compensation" formula, would in a case of lawful large-scale
nationalizations in a state undergoing a process of radical economic restructur-
ing normally require the "fair market value" standard to be discounted in tak-
ing account of "all circumstances."
Id. at 390. See also American International Group Case, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96,
102-10 (1983) (holding as a general principle of public international law that foreign
nationals are entitled to "the value of the property taken" and referring to the need to
determine "the going concern or fair market value" of the property).
97. Interlocutory Award in Case Concerning SEDCO, Inc. and National Iranian Oil
Co. and Iran, 25 I.L.M. 629 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, May 27, 1986).
98. Id. at 631. SEDCO argued that full compensation was due under article IV(2)
of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United
States of America and Iran which states:
Property of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party, includ-
ing interests in property, shall receive the most constant protection and security
within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, in no case less than
that required by international law. Such property shall not be taken except for
a public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just
compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively realizable form
and shall represent the full equivalent of the property taken; and adequate pro-
vision shall have been made at or prior to the time of taking for the determina-
tion and payment thereof.
Treaty of Amity, Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, 903 [hereinafter Treaty of
Amity].
99. SEDCO, 25 I.L.M. at 632.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 633-34. The tribunal in SEDCO noted that the International Court ofJus-
tice in Barcelona Traction, (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 40 (Feb. 5), rejected the
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ment that customary international law no longer required "full" compen-
sation for expropriated property.10 2 In doing so the Tribunal emphasized
that United Nations General Assembly Resolutions are nonbinding and do
not constitute customary international law, although in certain circum-
stances they may be regarded as evidence of customary international law
or contribute to the creation of such law. 10 3 The Tribunal also concluded
that the earlier General Assembly Resolution 1803 (of 1962) more accu-
rately reflects current international law in that it required "appropriate
compensation... in accordance with international lad' and international law
at the time required full compensation.' 0 4 Thus, Iran was required to
compensate SEDCO for the full value of the expropriated property under
both customary international law and the Treaty of Amity.'
5
In addition to the U.N. resolutions and international arbitrations dis-
cussed earlier, U.S. courts have also ruled on what constitutes 'just" or
"adequate" compensation for expropriated property. One of the more sig-
nificant recent decisions is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan
Bank.10 6 In Banco Nacional the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
"going concern" value (including lost profits) and awarded a lesser "net
book value" compensation for the nationalized Cuban branches of a U.S.
bank because the business did not qualify as a "going concern" at the time
of expropriation. 10 7 Although it awarded close to what it considered both
"appropriate" and "full" compensation, the court did not rule out the pos-
sibility that less than full compensation might be acceptable under inter-
national law in certain cases of expropriation:
significance of such "lump-sum" settlements as evidence of a deviation from the full
compensation standard in customary international law for the expropriation of alien
property. SEDCO, 25 LL.M. at 633. At least one commentator has argued, however,
that the SEDCO tribunal was mistaken when it referred to Barcelona Traction as rejecting
the significance of lump-sum payments as evidence of emerging international law.
Amerasinghe, supra note 85, at 29. This commentator interprets the Barcelona Traction
court to have said only that while lump-sum settlement agreements for less than full
value of seized alien property could be evidence of emerging customary international
law, such settlements were in actuality so varied as to the classes of beneficiaries of
compensation "that they could not be evidence of a consistent practice evidencing a
norm relating to such beneficiaries." Id.
102. SEDCO, 25 I.L.M. at 635.
103. Id. at 633-34. For additional support of the view that United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions, while sometimes considered as evidence of international law, are
not authoritative or binding as international law, see CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 87,
at 114-21. See also Amerasinghe, supra note 85, at 34 n.48 and sources cited therein.
104. SEDCO, 25 I.L.M. at 634 (quoting U.N. General Assembly Res. 1803). One com-
mentator argues that since CERDS was attempting to define a new international eco-
nomic order and create and promote certain economic conditions and relations among
states, the Resolution did not reflect the status of existing international law but rather a
prospective international economic order aspired to but not yet achieved. Amer-
asinghe, supra note 85, at 35.
105. SEDCO, 25 I.LM. at 635-36. See also Tippets v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 219, 225 (1989) (stating that the standard of compensation is "the full value" of
the property of which the claimant was deprived).
106. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
107. Id. at 892-94.
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It may well be the consensus of nations that full compensation need not be
paid "in all circumstances". . . and that requiring an expropriating state to
pay "appropriate compensation,"-even considering the lack of precise def-
inition of that term,-would come closest to reflecting what international
law requires. But the adoption of an "appropriate compensation" require-
ment would not exclude the possibility that in some cases full compensation
would be appropriate. We see no reason why the two standards may not
overlap .... 108
The admission of the Banco Nacional court that less than "full" compensa-
tion might be acceptable in some circumstances is consistent with the
Restatement's "exceptional circumstances" provisions.10 9
The domestic analogue to the dispute over "full" versus "appropriate"
compensation is found in the Supreme Court's public takings jurispru-
dence. Like the Restatement, which requires 'just" compensation for the
taking of the property of a national of another state, 110 the Fifth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution requires 'just" compensation for public tak-
ings of private property."' In interpreting 'just" compensation, the Court
"has been careful not to reduce the concept.., to a formula7112 or to
"prescribe a rigid rule."" 3 Nevertheless, the Court has normally accepted
"fair market value" as ajust standard.1" 4
Since "fair market value" cannot be considered less than "full" value,
it seems evident that "full" compensation is the rule in interpreting 'just"
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, with a narrow exception for
circumstances when "fair market value" cannot be determined.1 15
C. Appropriate Compensation for "Unlawful" Takings
Amidst the debate over what constitutes 'just" compensation for the
expropriation of alien property, the distinction between the level of com-
pensation for unlawful takings under international law, as opposed to com-
pensation for lawful takings, is often forgotten:
It is important in all cases to distinguish between unlawful takings of prop-
erty and lawful takings. In the former what is due is damages. In the latter
the alien must be compensated. There is dearly a distinction between the
108. Id. at 892 (foomotes and citation omitted).
109. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
110. RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES
§ 712(1) (1987).
111. "Nor shall private property be taken for public use withoutjust compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
113. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 839 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
114. Id. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (explaining that for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment, just compensation is normally measured by "the
market value of the property at the time of the taking."), reaffirmed in United States v. 50
Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
115. This is not to say that only "fair market value" is acceptable as "just" compensa-
tion. The Supreme Court has indicated that when "market value has been too difficult
to find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public"
courts are free to fashion or apply other standards of compensation. Commodities Trad-
ing Corp., 339 U.S. at 123.
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two cases, damages being naturally usually heavier than compensation....
It is particularly with respect to the element of lucrum cessans [future profits]
that the two situations differ, though there may be divergences even in
respect of damnum emergens [actual damages].116
For example, in Texaco Overseas Petroleum v. Libya,"l7 the international arbi-
trator held that the taking of property by Libya (by way of legislative can-
cellation of a contract containing a stabilization clause) was unlawful
under international law and thus required restitutio in integrum or "full res-
titution."118 This decision demonstrates that when the nationalization or
expropriation itself violates international law, the offending party is sub-
ject to damages potentially greater than the amount of the 'just!' or "ade-
quate" compensation due for otherwise "lawful" takings.
Although the compensation standard under international law for
expropriation has not been fully clarified, several principles do emerge
upon careful analysis. First, while discrete expropriations of property
clearly require "full" compensation in the sense of equivalent value, under
special circumstances, a court may award less than full compensation.
1 19
Second, following unlawful nationalizations or expropriations, courts may
award damages exceeding the value of 'just" compensation.' 2 0 Third,
there is no international uniformity in the approaches to valuation of dif-
ferent types of expropriated property or interests.'
2
'
IM. The U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC)
A. The History and Purpose of the FCSC
In 1954, President Eisenhower established the U.S. Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission as a semipermanent independent government organi-
zation' 2 2 by transferring to it the functions of the War Claims Commission
and the International Claims Commission.'2 3 The mission of the FCSC,
according to former Chairman of the Commission Stanley J. Glod,' 2 4 is
the "adjudication of claims of American citizens, corporations and other
legally constituted entities against foreign governments for the nationaliza-
tion, expropriation or other uncompensated taking of their property and/
116. Amerasinghe, supra note 85, at 37-88.
117. 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
118. Id. at 36.
119. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
121. Amerasinghee, supra note 85, at 57-62.
122. The Commission was created by the President's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1954, 68 Stat. 1279, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1291 (1988).
123. StanleyJ. Glod, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States: Reso-
lution of International Claims in the Nineties and Beyond, 37 FED. BAR NEws &J. 140 (1990).
In 1980, the FCSC was transferred to the Department ofJustice as a separate agency of
that Department. Act of Mar. 14, 1980, Pub. L No. 96-209, 94 Star. 96 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1622a (1988)).
124. The leadership of the FCSC is comprised of a Chairman and two Commission-
ers who are appointed by the President and who must be confirmed by the Senate.
Glod, supra note 123, at 140.
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or interests, losses or injuries sustained by them."12 5 While the FCSC
determines the validity and value of claims of U.S. citizens and corpora-
dons, the awards it makes are not actually paid to claimants until compen-
sation is received from the offending nation. It is the responsibility of the
Executive Branch, through the Department of State, to negotiate with for-
eign governments for the settlement of U.S. citizens' claims.126 Payment
from the offending country can come either prior to the FCSC's adjudica-
tion of claims12 7 or after.128
Congress granted the FCSC the authority to adjudicate these claims
through enabling legislation in the form of Amendments (Tides) to the
International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA) of 1949.129 The decisions of
the FCSC are final and conclusive on questions of law and fact surround-
ing claims and are not subject to review or appeal to any other govern-
ment agency or court of law.13o
125. Id.
126. An injured individual has no legally enforceable right against his own govern-
ment, however, to compel it to press a claim diplomatically against a foreign state.
Redpath v. Kissinger, 415 F. Supp. 566, 569 (W.D. Tex. 1976), affd, 545 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1976).
127. SeeJames H. Grossman & David M. Frost, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of
the United States-A Paradigm for International Claims Resolution, 21 INTL Bus. LAw. 276,
276-77 (1993). Under this type of agreement the government in question pays a lump-
sum of money as settlement for all pending claims by United States nationals against
that government. A fund is then established in the United States Treasury, and the
FCSC authorizes awards from that fund to meritorious claims. The claims programs
against Egypt, Yugoslavia, and Iran all used this type of claims settlement procedure. Id.
128. Id. In this type, called pre-adjudication, the FCSC obtains enabling legislation
from Congress and then receives and adjudicates the validity of claims in anticipation of
a future settlement agreement between the United States and the offending govern-
ment. The advantage of this procedure is that it allows for adjudication while the evi-
dence and memories of claimants is still relatively fresh. This form of pre-adjudication
was used in the case of claims against Cuba, the German Democratic Republic (East
Germany), and Vietnam. Id.
129. International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (ICSA), Pub. L. No. 81-455, 64 Stat.
13 (1950) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1645o (1988)). Congress may
defer to institutions other than the FCSC, such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, to
adjudicate claims of Americans. See generallyJOnN A. WESTBERG, INTERNA-iONAL TRANS-
ACTIONS AND CLAIMS INVOLVING GOVERNmENT PARTIES: CASE LAw OF THE IRAN-UNrrED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1991); Norbert Wihler, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1991, at 5.
Likewise, the United Nations Compensation Commission was established to adjudi-
cate claims arising from the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91. See
generally Bachir G. Affaid, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New Era in
Claims Settlements ?, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1993, at 21; Charles N. Brower, The Lessons of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunak How May They be Applied in the Case of Iraq?, 32 VA.J.
INT'L L. 421 (1992); Massimo Galli, Sue orLose: An Agenda forAmerican Corporations and
Companies Seeking Compensation From Iraq, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L REv. 241 (1993); Nicolas
C. Ulmer, The Gulf War Claims Institution, J. INT'L ARR., Mar. 1993, at 85.
130. Grossman & Frost, supra note 127, at 277. A claimant who disagrees with the
FCSC's initial disposition of his or her claim is nevertheless entitled to have the FCSC
reconsider its initial decision at an oral hearing where new evidence or arguments may
be entered before a final decision is made. Id.
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B. Previous Claims Programs of the FCSC
Since its inception, the FCSC (and its two predecessor commissions) have
adjudicated forty claims programs involving over 660,000 claims against
sixteen nations.' 3 1 It has granted over $3 billion in awards.1 3 2 Claims
adjudicated by the FCSC range in scope from losses suffered by the repu-
diation of Czarist Russian bonds held by U.S. citizens to awards for torture
and physical deprivation of American POWs during World War II and the
Korean and Vietnam Wars.' 33 There is no limit to the number of claims
or dollar value of claims the FCSC has authority to adjudicate.
In 1980, Congress passed Title VII of the International Claims Settle-
ment Act,'3 which authorized the FCSC to consider and value the claims
of U.S. nationals against Vietnam for the seizure of property after April 29,
1975.13 5 The purpose of Title VII was
to provide for the determination of the validity and amounts of outstanding
claims against Vietnam which arose out of the nationalization, expropria-
tion, or other taking of (or special measures directed against) property of
nationals of the United States. This title shall not be construed as authoriz-
ing or as any intention to authorize an appropriation by [the Congress of]
the United States for the purpose of paying such claims.' 3 6
Title VII required that the FCSC adjudicate the claims of nationals of the
United States against Vietnam in "accordance with applicable substantive
law, including international law."13 7 This means that the FCSC was obli-
gated to apply the standards of compensation for expropriated property as
mandated by international law.
IV. U.S. Citizens' Claims Against Vietnam
Between 1980 and 1986 the FCSC heard 534 claims against Vietnam for
expropriated property of U.S. citizens and corporations, and it granted
awards in 192 of those claims.' 3 8 The awards amounted to $99,471,983.51
in principal, with interest to be compounded to each award at the rate of
6% per year from the date of loss until the date of payment.' 3 9 Govern-
131. Glod, supra note 123, at 140. A claims program brings together for adjudication
all U.S. citizens' or corporations' claims against a particular country arising out of a
nationalization or expropriation undertaken by that country within a statutorily speci-
fied period of time. Previous claims programs have been adjudicated against Yugosla-
via, Panama, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Italy, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Cuba, the People's Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic (East
Germany), Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt and Vietnam. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 141.
134. Act of Dec. 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-606, 94 Stat. 3534 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. §§ 1645-1645 (1988)); International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (ICSA),
Pub. L. No. 81-455, 64 Stat. 12 (1950) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1645o
(1988)).
135. Id.
136. 22 U.S.C. § 1645.
137. 22 U.S.C. § 1645b.
138. Brown, supra note 3, at 101.
139. Id.
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ment officials recently estimated that the value of the private claims adju-
dicated by the FCSC totaled, with interest added, $230-250 million. 14°
These claims range in size from a pre-interest award of $35.1 million
granted to Exxon Corporation for gas stations, vehicles, and oil explora-
tion equipment to the $171.66 awarded to Joseph Sturgeon, Jr. for the
balance left in a Saigon bank seized by Communist authorities after the
war.141
A. Eligibility, Compensability, and Valuation of Claims
1. Eligibility
To be eligible for compensation under the Vietnam Claims Program (Title
VII), a claimant had the burden of proving the elements of a valid
claim.142 First, the claim could be entertained only if the property seized
was owned by a national of the United States or a corporation at least fifty
percent owned by nationals of the United States at the time of the nation-
alization, expropriation, or other taking.143 The claim also must have
been held continuously by U.S. nationals or corporations from the date of
loss until the filing of the claim with the FCSC.'4
2. Compensability
Second, the claimant must have had a compensable claim under the
enabling statute and international law. Compensable claims under the
enabling statute were those claims "arising on or after April 29, 1975, for
losses incurred as a result of the nationalization, expropriation, or other
taking of (or special measures directed against) property" of nationals or
corporations of the United States.145
140. U.S. Relations with Vietnam: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Mr.
R, Richard Newcomb, Director of Foreign Asset Control, Department of Treasury).
141. Bob Deans, U.S. Wants Hanoi to Repay Losses, PHOENrX GAzE, Feb. 11, 1994, at
A19.
142. 45 C.F.R. § 531.6(d) (1993) ("The claimant shall be the moving party and shall
have the burden of proof on all issues involved in the determination of his or her
claim.").
143. The enabling statute, 22 U.S.C. § 1645a(1), defined "national of the United
States" as:
(A) a natural person who is a citizen of the United States; and
(B) a corporation or other legal entity which is organized under the laws of the
United States or of any State, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, if natural persons who are citizens of the United States own,
directly or indirectly, 50 per centum or more of the outstanding capital stock or
other beneficial interest of such corporation or entity.
Id.
144. 22 U.S.C. § 1645c. The requirement that the claim be continuously held by a
U.S. national was the basis of rejection for over 50% of all claims filed with the FCSC.
Brown, supra note 3, at 110.
145. 22 U.S.C. § 1645b. The term "property" was defined as "(A) any property, right,
or interest, including any leasehold interest, (B) any debt owed by Vietnam or by any
enterprise which has been nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by Vietnam,
and (C) any debt which is a charge on property which has been nationalized, expropri-
ated, or otherwise taken by Vietnam." 22 U.S.C. § 1645a(3).
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The compensability of a claim under international law was deter-
mined according to the individual facts of the claim and precedent estab-
lished by international tribunals, as discussed supra. However, the FCSC
made several rather controversial decisions that facilitated favorable adju-
dications of claims against Vietnam. First, the FCSC allowed claimants to
prove ownership at the time of loss by the "secondary evidence rule."'146
This rule allowed claimants to prove ownership through detailed lists, affi-
davits, corporate financial statements, and other unofficial records, includ-
ing photographs. 147 Second, the FCSC determined that the official policy
of the victorious Communist government was to take control of all the
property belonging to Americans and South Vietnamese who fled the
country in April 1973.148 This determination allowed individuals who
were unsure what had happened to their property after they fled Vietnam
to overcome successfully the statutory burden of proving their property
was actually taken by Vietnamese government authorities.149 Third, the
FCSC determined that all bank accounts in Vietnam were effectively taken
on May 1, 1975, when the Communist authorities announced their confis-
cation and instituted strict controls over withdrawals of bank funds.'
5 0
3. Valuation
The third aspect of foreign claims adjudication, after the eligibility of the
claimant and the compensability of the claim have been decided, is the
valuation of the claim. "Property valuation by the Commission prior to
settlement negotiations," notes one commentator, "enables the United
States to assert unilaterally its own evaluation of what would constitute ade-
quate and effective compensation in each case." 15 1 Title VII granted the
FCSC the authority to determine the value of each Vietnam claim "in
accordance with applicable substantive law, including international
law."' 5 2 Title V of the ICSA, which authorized the Cuba and China claims
programs, included additional instructions on the valuation of claims.
These instructions required the FCSC to "take into account ... (i) fair
market value, (ii) book value, (iii) going concern value, or (iv) cost of
replacement." 53 Because Title VII did not include the same four valua-
146. Brown, supra note 3, at 105.
147. See, e.g., Claim of R.G. Westervelt, Claim No. V-0088, Dec. No. V-0312, at 2
(FCSC Aug. 13, 1985) (where the claimant's only evidence of ownership was "a four-
page listing of the property giving a description and cost and date of purchase of each
item").
148. See, e.g., Claim of BettyJanet Mitchell, Claim No. V-0358, Dec. No. V-0259, at 2-3
(FCSC Mar. 11, 1985).
149. See 45 C.F.R. § 531.6(d) (1993).
150. See, e.g., Claim of The Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Claim No. V-0261, Dec. No. V-
0439 (FCSC Oct. 15, 1985) (holding that the claimant, a non-profit corporation, was
entitled to compensation for the loss of two accounts held in the Saigon branch of the
Chase Manhattan Bank).
151. Brown, supra note 3, at 120.
152. 22 U.S.C. § 1645b.
153. 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a).
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don techniques, the FCSC determined it was not bound by Title V.154
Nevertheless, the FCSC utilized the Cuba and China claims valuation tech-
niques as precedent for its Vietnam claims program valuations.' 55
In adjudicating the Vietnam claims, the FCSC used four types of prop-
erty valuation principles and techniques.1 56 Personal property was valued
by taking the purchase price and calculating its value in 1975 according to
a specific depreciation schedule. 15 7 Real property was valued by awarding
either the property's appraised value or its purchase price plus the cost of
substantiated improvements and an allowance for appreciation.
158 Oil
concessions were valued at the cost of the fees paid for the concessions
plus capitalized expenditures.' 5 9 No awards were made for the loss of pro-
spective earnings from unproven oil reserves because such prospective
earnings were incapable of accurate measurement.
160
Business interests seized as "going concerns" were entitled to lost
future profits under international law.161 The FCSC had also previously
recognized that lost profits "should be considered" if they could be proven
with some certainty.162 Nevertheless, only two Vietnam claimants were
154. Brown, supra note 3, at 122.
155. Id. at 121-22.
156. For a detailed explanation of the different methods used to value interests and
property in foreign claims adjudication, see Amerasinghe, supra note 85, at 50-51 n.102;
see also Dale R. Weigel & Burns H. Weston, Valuation upon the Deprivation of Foreign Enter-
prise: A Policy Oriented Approach to the Problem of Compensation Under International Law in 1
THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3, 16-23 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1972).
157. See, e.g., Claim of Russell Theodore Delong, Claim No. V-0161, Dec. No. V-0374,
at 3 (FCSCJuly 1, 1985). For example, art objects and other valuables such as silver and
jewelry were not depreciated while clothing was depreciated at 20% per year. All other
household and personal objects were depreciated at 5% per year. Brown, supra note 3,
at 122 n.138.
158. See, e.g., Claim of Thu Dunton & Lyman L Dunton, Claim No. V-0526, Dec. No.
V-0495, at 2 (FCSC Oct. 15, 1985) (where the FCSC awarded $4,000 for a house valued
at $3,500 from bank account records).
159. See Claim of Ameranda Hess Corp. of Vietnam, Claim No. V-0247, Dec. No. V-
0427, at 6 (FCSC Nov. 19, 1985). "Capitalized expenditures" included items such as the
cost of geological and seismic studies while outlays for "ordinary administrative costs,"
such as the drilling of dry holes, were considered routine business costs that did not
"rise to the level of compensable property." Claim ofJoint Venture of Pecten Vietnam
Co. & Vietnam Cities Serv., Inc., Claim No. V-0522, Dec. No. V-0425, at 3, 11 (FCSC
Nov. 19, 1985).
160. Brown, supra note 3, at 127; see, e.g., Claim of Esso Exploration & Production
Vietnam, Inc., Claim No. V-0236, Dec. No. V-0436, at 4 (FCSC Aug. 13, 1985).
161. See Brice M. Clagett, The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-United States Claims Tri-
buna" Is "Just Compensation"Required by lnternational Law or Not , 16 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 813, 839 (1984); Henry T.C. Hu, Compensation in Expropriations: A Preliminary Eco-
nomic Analysis, 20 VA.J. INT'L L. 61, 68 (1979); RichardJ. Smith, The United States Govern-
ment Perspective on Expropriation and Investment in Developing Countries, 9 VAND J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 517, 519 (1976). "The most appropriate method of measuring 'going
concern value' is by discounting or capitalizing the reasonably ascertainable future
earnings of the business." Brown, supra note 8, at 130.
162. Brown, supra note 3, at 130. In the Claim of First Nat'l Bank of Boston, Claim
No. CU-2268, Dec. No. CU-3071 (FCSC Feb. 26, 1969), the FCSC determined that
where a bank had lost six branch offices as a result of Cuba's nationalization of the
banking industry, "the nature of the business conducted is such that earnings potential
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able to obtain an award approximating lost future profits.' 63 The remain-
ing lost business claims were valued according to "book value" of the busi-
ness.16 The FCSC claimed it was not bound to award lost profits because
there was no specific legislative directive to do so (as there was in Tide V),
and the Second Circuit had rejected the appropriateness of lost profits
under international law under circumstances similar to those faced by
claimants before the FCSC.165 Congress subsequently rejected the FCSC's
position and amended the ICSA to require "going concern value" as a
viable and acceptable valuation approach in all future foreign claims
adjudications.166
... is of greater significance than asset value in the determination of true value of the
enterprise at any given time." Id. at 4.
163. Brown, supra note 3, at 131; see Claim of George D. Yaron, Claim No. V-0006,
Dec. No. V-0424, at 4 (FCSCJan. 22. 1986); Claim of American Int'l Group, Claim No.
V-0330, Dec. No. V-0404 (FCSC Jan. 22, 1986).
164. Brown, supra note 3, at 131-39. Book value has often been criticized as the least
acceptable method for valuation of expropriated property because it yields a figure
"which in most cases bears little relationship to actual value." Smith, supra note 161, at
519. To determine book value, also known as "net asset value" or "net worth," the FCSC
closely examined balance sheets as of the date of nationalization. Liquid assets such as
bank accounts, inventories, and cash reserves were included in the net worth computa-
tion. See Claim of Esso Eastern, Inc., Claim No. V-0235, Dec. No. V-0438, at 4-5 (FCSC
Aug. 13, 1985). Where the nationalized business was a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation,
the FCSC excluded from total assets the accounts receivable from the U.S. parent on
the assumption that they were never paid by the claimant. See Claim of American Trad-
ing Co., Inc., Claim No. V-0042, Dec. No. V-0415, at 4 (FCSC Aug. 13, 1985). Pre-
operation and formation costs were included as assets to the extent that they consti-
tuted "capitalized expenditures" under generally accepted accounting principles. See
Claim of Frank H. Hopkins, Claim No. V-0185, Dec. No. V-0471, Supp. Final Dec. at 8-9
(FCSC Feb. 25, 1986).
On the liabilities side of the ledger, accounts payable to a U.S. parent corporation
were excluded on the theory that accounts payable were debts taken on by Viemam at
the time of the nationalization. See Claim of American Trading Co., Inc., Claim No. V-
0042, Dec. No. V-0415, at 4 (FCSC Aug. 13, 1985). Notes payable and other accounts
representing paid-in capital of a U.S. national owner were similarly excluded from the
net asset value computation. See, e.g., Claim of Frank H. Hopkins, Claim No. V-0185,
Dec. No. V-0471, Proposed Dec. at 4 (FCSC Aug. 27, 1985).
165. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 894 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that Chase was not entitled to going concern value for the loss of its
branches nationalized in Cuba where "many of Chase's actual or potential customers
had or were about to have their own business nationalized.., and.., the government
would soon decree that those who remained carry on their banking transactions only
with government-owned banks").
166. Pub. L. No. 99-451, 100 Stat. 1138 (1986), amending22 U.S.C. § 1623(a).
Fair market value shall be ascertained in accordance with the method most
appropriate to the property taken and equitable to the claimant, including-
(i) market value of outstanding equity securities;
(ii) replacement value;
(iii) going-concern value (which includes consideration of an enterprise'sprofitabil-
ity, and
(iv) book value.
In the case of any claim for losses in a service industry, the appropriate basis of
valuation shall be presumed to be that referred to in clause (iii).
Id. (emphasis added). See also Brown, supra note 3, at 135-36.
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B. U.S. Government Claims Against Vietnam
Other claims against Vietnam existed in addition to the claims of U.S. citi-
zens and corporations adjudicated by the FCSC under Tide VII of the
ICSA. For example, the U.S. government lost millions of dollars in mili-
tary equipment, aircraft, buildings, and other items when it abandoned
South Vietnam on April 30, 1975.167 The value of U.S. government prop-
erty seized by the communist authorities has never been accurately deter-
mined. 168 One source has reported that the value of the U.S.
government's expropriated property claims totals about $250 million,
excluding claims for lost military equipment.'
6 9
Under the War Claims Act of 1948,170 the FCSC is also authorized to
adjudicate claims of former U.S. prisoners-of-war' 71 and civilian intern-
ees, 17 2 captured and interred by hostile forces in Southeast Asia during
the Vietnam conflict, for inadequate rations and inhumane treatment
while in captured status. Through early 1990, the FCSC had granted
$5,347,773 in awards to 736 former prisoners-of-war or their survivors' 73
and $229,337 in awards to forty-one civilian internees.' 7 4 Payment of the
awards made by the FCSC to Americans held prisoner during the Korean
and Vietnam Wars have already been made with funds appropriated by
Congress. 175
V. Satisfaction of Claims Against Vietnam
The claims adjudication process conducted by the FCSC did not conclude
the process of gaining restitution for U.S. property seized by Vietnam.
President Clinton's decision to present the claims of U.S. citizens for com-
pensation was entirely dependent on the domestic law of the United States
and the foreign policy considerations of the President and Congress.
176
A. Full Satisfaction of Claims
International law entitled U.S. nationals to 'just" compensation for their
expropriated property in Vietnam. 177 In this instance, 'just" compensa-
tion equalled "full" compensation for three reasons. First, the taking of
167. Vause, supra note 51, at 239.
168. POW/MM: After the Embargo, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacfic of
the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Robert G.
Torricelli (D-NJ)).
169. See Settlement ofAmerican Claims Agaiwt VietnameseAssets, Bus. Asm, Aug. 16,1993.
170. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2001-17 (1988).
171. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2005(f) (1988).
172. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2004(i) (1988).
173. Glod, supra note 123, at 141.
174. Id.
175. Grossman & Frost, supra note 127, at 277.
176. 6 J.B. MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 616 (1906). Brown, supra note 3, at 140
n.232 (citing Redpath v. Kissinger, 415 F. Supp. 566, 569 (W.D. Tex. 1976), affid 545
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that "an injured individual has no legally enforceable
right against his own government to compel it to press a claim diplomatically against a
foreign state")).
177. See discussion, supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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American property would not constitute "exceptional circumstances" as
that term is defined in the Restatement or in decisions of international
tribunals. 178 Second, the Communist North Vietnamese authorities'
expropriation of American property after the fall of South Vietnam was
not a lawful taking because the invasion which led to the taking violated
the Paris Peace Accords 17 9 and the U.N. Charter.' 8 0 Thus, the claimants
would be entitled to damages which are "naturally usually heavier than
compensation."' 8 ' Third, the takings by Vietnam after April 29, 1975 were
of the same character (though far fewer in number and of much lesser
value) as those of Iran after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, yet the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal found no "exceptional circumstances" allowing for
less than "full" compensation.' 8 2 Consequently, Vietnam should be
required to pay "full" compensation for the claims of U.S. citizens.
1. "Exceptional Circumstances" Exception
The seizure of virtually all private property and industry by Communist
authorities after the fall of South Vietnam on April 30, 1975 might seem
initially like the "exceptional circumstances" which the Restatement, sev-
eral recent international arbitrations, and U.S. court decisions have indi-
cated permit deviation from the standard of "full" compensation. The
Vietnam expropriations were full-scale seizures of the property of fleeing
American nationals. On May 1, 1975, the day after Saigon fell to North
Vietnamese forces, Communist authorities in South Vietnam issued a
decree declaring that "all . . . industrial, agricultural and commercial
establishments, banks, communication and transport, cultural, educa-
tional and health establishments, warehouses . . . together with docu-
ments, files, property and technical means of U.S. imperialism... will be
confiscated, and from now on, managed by the revolutionary administra-
tion."183 While not all industries and property of American or South
Vietnamese citizens were immediately seized, 184 Vietnam did attempt to
institute a collectivized agricultural system and circumscribed the private
ownership of real property.' 85 Likewise, all major industries, including
banking, transportation, health, and education were subsequently
178. See discussion, supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
179. See Paris Peace Accords, supra note 10, art. 7.
180. U.N. CHAR=Tma art. 2, 14.
181. See discussion, supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
182. See discussion, supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text. See also ALLAHYAN
Douu, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE WORK OF THE
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 363-90 (1993).
183. Communique No. 3 of the Saigon-Gia Dinh City Military Management Commit-
tee, FBIS, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific (NTIS) L-2, L-3 (May 1, 1975) (quoted in
Vishipco line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 976 (1982)).
184. See, e.g., Claim of Ly Thi Vianzon, Claim No. V-0474, Dec. No. V-0351, at 1
(FCSC Jan. 22, 1986) (where claimant was not able to prove that her house in Saigon
had been taken on August 1, 1978).
185. SeeVo NHAN Tmi, VIErNAm's ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE 1975 at 75-85 (1990); ADAM
FFORDE & STEFAN DE VYujER, VmENAM-AN ECONOMY IN TRANSrrION 61-64 (1988).
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nationalized. x86
Such full-scale expropriations, some might argue, fall under the
"exceptional circumstances" exception incorporated in the Restatement.
However, the Restatement also indicates that a departure from the general
rule of full compensation is not warranted if the property taken "was an
enterprise taken for operation by the state as a going concern."' 8 7 Addi-
tionally, the Reporter's Notes clarify that nationalizations of investments in
natural resources (such as oil concessions) or of going business concerns,
which would generate funds from which compensation could be paid,
would not constitute exceptional circumstances permitting other than full
compensation.18 8 Therefore, any property, investments, or enterprises
seized by Vietnam which were taken in order to be operated or used for
production by the Vietnamese government, rather than for redistribution
among the landless poor as in the case of agrarian reform, would require
"full" compensation under the Restatement's approach. Because over
ninety-two percent of the value of the FCSC's awards to U.S. claimants
were made to twenty-one corporate claimants,' 8 9 whose businesses were
seized or whose investments were nullified, full compensation out of the
operation of these going concerns is possible, and the "exceptional cir-
cumstances" deviation from full compensation is therefore not warranted
under international law.
2. Takings in Violation of International Law
Full compensation is also justified under international law because the tak-
ing of American property by Communist Vietnamese authorities was
accomplished illegally through the use of unlawful force of arms. The
North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam in the spring of 1975 vio-
lated basic non-aggression principles of international law and article 2 of
the U.N. Charter.' 90 The North Vietnamese invasion also violated the spe-
cific non-aggression provisions of the Paris Peace Accords. 19 1 An unlawful
taking of property entitles the claimant to damages which may exceed the
value of fair compensation for the property had it been lawfully taken.
192
Because all of the property of Americans in South Vietnam was taken as a
186. Vo NHAN Tm, supra note 185, at 89-90.
187. RE TATEMENT (THnD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrTED STATES
§ 712(1), cmt. d (1987). A "going concern" is a business that is functional and opera-
tional at the time of its seizure and which continues to operate in the same or similar
manner after seizure. The most frequently asserted "exceptional circumstances"justifi-
cation for less than "full" compensation involves expropriation as part of a national
program of agricultural land reform.
188. Id. at rep. note 3.
189. Brown, supra note 3, at 152.
190. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 14. "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State .... " Id. This makes it clear that the use of armed force to achieve
international political objectives is not legitimate. There is, of course, a self-defense
exception to the ban on the use of force. See U arts. 39, 51.
191. See id. art. 7.
192. See discussion, supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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direct result of unlawful aggression by North Vietnam, U.S. claimants are
entitled to damages which would be heavier than compensation and which
would specifically allow compensation for lost profits (lucrum cessans).
3. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Precedent
Finally, full compensation is also required when the Vietnam expropria-
tions are examined in light of the decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribu-
nal, established under the Algiers Accords to adjudicate the takings of
American property by the fundamentalist Iranian government following
the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979.193 In Iran, the seizures fol-
lowed the overthrow of the duly constituted government of the Shah and
involved many industry-wide nationalizations of, for example, banking and
oil production and a complete transformation of the political system from
a sectarian autocracy to a fundamentalist Moslem theocracy. 194 Not even
the widespread, systemic nationalization of entire industries following a
political revolution was determined by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to
merit deviation from the standard of full compensation under interna-
tional law. 19 5 Similarly, Vietnam's subsequent widespread nationalization
of industries and seizure of property in order to transfer wealth and trans-
form the society to one based on socialist principles would not necessarily
merit deviation from the full compensation standard for the property of
U.S. citizens seized in 1975. The individual expropriations of private
property undertaken months or years before systematic nationalization
and economic reform' 9 6 would almost surely not qualify for any exception
to full compensation.' 9 7 Whether the nationalizations would fall under
the Restatement exceptions would depend, according to one commenta-
tor, on whether the seizures related to:
(i) land reforms or "indigenisation" which do not result in income for the
State, or (ii) circumstances in which the nationalising State would otherwise
have an overwhelming financial burden, or (iii) the large or extensive scale
of the nationalisation directed at the establishment of State control over the
economy or a substantially large sector of it, or (iv) the post-colonial charac-
ter of the nationalisation. 19 8
The nationalizations following the Communist victory over South
Vietnam could not take advantage of considerations (i), (ii), or (iv)
193. See supra note 95.
194. One commentator explains the purposes of the Iranian nationalizations to have
been to "(1) reorder Iranian industry which was in a chaotic state before and during the
revolution, (2) redistribute wealth and ameliorate the harsher aspects of the capitalist
system, and (3) remove dependence on foreign capital." Amerasinghe, supra note 85,
at 45.
195. Id. at 62.
196. A large fraction of private businesses in South Vietnam were not seized by the
state and nationalized until 1977. Vo NHA- Tiu, supra note 185, at 89.
197. Id.
198. Amerasinghe, supra note 85, at 48.
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because the state did derive income from the seizure of land,19 9 would not
be burdened by the relatively small value of the U.S. claims,20 0 and did not
act in the context of decolonization because it had achieved indepen-
dence from the French in 1954.201 It could be argued that consideration
(iii), "the large or extensive scale of the nationalization directed at the
establishment of State control over the economy or a substantially large
sector of it," might permit deviation from the standard of full compensa-
tion. The Iranian nationalization of its economy's largest sector, the oil
industry, did not, however, justify deviation from full compensation even
though the financial burden involved in those claims alone might have
been considered overwhelming.20 2
Additionally, American property was seized immediately while most
private businesses belonging to South Vietnamese were seized in subse-
quent nationalization or economic reform programs. Thus the seizures of
Americans' property are more correctly seen as expropriations requiring
full compensation rather than as part of nationalization, which may allow
less than full compensation. Furthermore, satisfaction of one or more of
the four considerations outlined above does not automatically permit the
nationalizing nation to pay less than full compensation if other considera-
tions point in the opposite direction. In the case of Vietnam, the small
size of the American claims, even when including the potential value of
the U.S. government's claims, suggests applying the full compensation
standard as was applied in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal decisions.
Not surprisingly, there is substantial domestic pressure on U.S. offi-
cials to obtain full satisfaction of claims from Vietnam. This pressure can
be seen, for example, in the public statements of senators and congress-
men. For instance, during testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in February 1994, shortly after President Clinton announced
the lifting of the economic embargo, Rep. Robert G. Torricelli and other
memebers of the House of Representatives publicly urged the Clinton
Administration to "seek the full value of the claims of private citizens"
because no mitigating factors exist.20 3
199. Excess (outside the family plot) agricultural production under the socialist sys-
tem of collectivized farming imposed in South Vietnam went directly to the state. Vo
Nm TRm, supra note 185, at 16-18, 81.
200. While private American claims at the time of their taking totalled about $100
millon, Vietnam's aid from the Soviet Union for defense and the military alone totalled
$5 billion annually during the late 1970s and early 1980s. BOUDREAU, supra note 33, at
48.
201. See HERRING, supra note 11, at 1-43.
202. The Iran claims filed and eventually adjudicated by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribu-
nal totaled over $2 billion. See David P. Stewart, Iran-US. Claims Tribunak A Review of
Developments, 1983-84, 16 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 677, 683-86 (1984).
203. POW/MIA: After the Embargo, Hearings Before the Asia and Pacific Subcomm. of the
House Foreign Affairs Comm., 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994) (statement of Representative
Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ)).
Historically, the [State] Department has weighed several factors, including the
strategic importance of reaching an agreement with the country, the morality
of obtaining justice for U.S. citizens, and the availability of funds to satisfy the
claims to determine the percentage of claims settlement. In the present case
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In previous negotiations for satisfaction of foreign claims, however,
the United States has often settled, for various foreign and economic pol-
icy reasons, for less than full compensation. 204 For example, since the
United States began the practice of adjudicating claims prior to compensa-
tion negotiations with the offending country, it has subsequently negoti-
ated settlement agreements with six countries. 205 Claimants in those six
claims programs received only an average of 38.4% of the value of their
awards.206 Such lump-sum settlements are a failure when measured
against the principles of international law because not only do U.S. claim-
ants often not receive full compensation, but they do not receive it
"promptly."20 7 The standard six percent interest rate awarded by the
FCSC208 also does not adequately compensate claimants for the value of
the loss of use of their money, particularly in the years since 1970 when
interest rates often exceeded ten percent annually.209
In summary, U.S. claimants against Vietnam were entitled to full com-
pensation under international law for their expropriated property. The
business enterprises seized by North Vietnam, which constituted the vast
majority of the U.S. property taken, were either natural resource invest-
ments or were operated by Vietnam after they were seized. Since the
seizures were not conducted for agrarian land reform, they are not eligible
for the deviation from full compensation which international law may per-
mit in "exceptional circumstances."
B. Possible Vesting of Vietnamese Assets in the United States
Vietnam's agreement to pay the full value of U.S. claims was accompanied
by a U.S. pledge to unfreeze Vietnamese assets held in U.S. banks.2 10 This
agreement averted the possible option of "vesting" Vietnamese assets to
with Vietnam there would appear to be no legitimate reason why the Depart-
ment would accept a figure that is less than the total principal and interest of
the awards. There exist sufficient funds to satisfy the claims, the claims of the
U.S. citizens have been adjudicated, and there is no strategic importance to
justify accepting a lower settlement.
The U.S. government is the sole representative of our citizens' claims and has
an obligation to them to reach the fairest possible settlement. These citizens
have no legal recourse outside of the government's action. I urge the Clinton
Administration to be as responsive to these citizens as they were to the govern-
ment twenty years ago. We must forcefully assert the right of American claim-
ants to full compensation.
Id.
204. Brown, supra note 3, at 140-41.
205. Id. at 141-43.
206. Id. The countries involved with the percentage of the value of claims received
are as follows: Bulgarian claimants = 59.3%, Rumanian claimants = 28.9%, Hungarian
claimants = 26.3%, Soviet claimants = 9.7%, Czech claimants = 73.1%, and Chinese
claimants = 40.0%. The pre-adjudicated claims against Cuba and East Germany have
not reached negotiated settlements. Id.
207. For example, the Chinese claims were not settled until 30 years after they arose.
Id. at 143-44.
208. Id. at 144.
209. Id. at 145 n.256.
210. Greenhouse, supra note 9, at Al.
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pay U.S. claimants. When North Vietnamese forces overran Saigon on
April 30, 1975, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control, under orders of President Gerald Ford, froze all assets of
the South Vietnamese government in U.S. banks.2 1 1 With interest, the
dollar value of blocked South Vietnamese assets reached well over $240
million.2 1 2 Had the United States decided to "vest" (seize and convert)
these assets, they would have been more than sufficient to pay the $200
million in U.S. claims adjudicated by the FCSC. In fact, legislation which
would have done just that was introduced and considered, but never
approved, by Congress in 1990.213
While vesting of blocked South Vietnamese assets would have allowed
for immediate payment of private U.S. claims against Vietnam (a superfi-
cially attractive option which would have eliminated the need for extensive
bilateral negotiation), such action would have been counterproductive to
U.S. interests for several reasons. First, as these assets were the property of
the South Vietnamese government, there is a question as to whether the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the purported successor state to South Viet-
nam, even had legal title to the blocked assets.
The question of who actually owns the funds is really a question of state
succession. The funds belonged to the former Government of the Republic
of Vietnam [South Vietnam]. That government no longer exists. At the
current time we do not recognize the Government of the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam.21 4
Because the United States still does not officially recognize the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam as the legitimate government in South Vietnam, 2 1 5
any claim that Vietnam would have had to these assets would have been
contingent on the United States agreeing that Vietnam was entitled to
them.2 1 6
Second, as a general rule, the United States does not support the
seizure and conversion of another government's assets as a "self-help mea-
sure."2 17 Only once has the United States vested the assets of a foreign
government in peacetime to pay claims without the agreement of the gov-
ernment in question.2 18 Vesting is an "irrevocable final action" in which
title to the property is seized, which involves an actual confiscation of
211. Lori Y. Vassar, Foreign Assets ControL. Proposed Vesting of Vietnamese Asses, 84 Am.J.
INT'L LAw 539 (1990).
212. Id. at 541.
213. See H.R. 2166, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
214. Vassar, supra note 211, at 544.
215. Id. at 542.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 541.
218. Id. The United States vested Czechoslovakian steel mill equipment to pay
claims arising out of post-World War II claims of Americans for property seized by the
Czech government. Unsuccessful negotiations between the United States and Czecho-
slovakia for satisfaction of U.S. claims had lasted ten years, and the property was in
danger of deteriorating to the point of worthlessness. This instance of vesting, was,
therefore, practically unavoidable and should not be seen as precedent for the vesting
of Vietnamese assets. Id.
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property.219 While the "owner" of the blocked assets (the South
Vietnamese government) no longer exists, the conversion of the assets
might nevertheless create a perception of the United States as an unsafe
place for investment of foreign capital. 220 It is also likely that those states
who recognize the Vietnamese government as the lawful successor to the
South Vietnamese government would have seen the vesting as "arbitrary,
unjustified, and counter to international practice."221 The vesting of
South Vietnam's assets might also have encouraged other states similarly
to block assets owned abroad by the United States-a precedent the
United States certainly did not want to encourage.222
Third, vesting the South Vietnamese assets to pay private claims of
Americans would have left no assets to pay substantial U.S. government
claims against Vietnam should negotiations have failed.223 Such vesting
might also have reduced the incentives for Vietnam to pay both private
and government claims in the negotiated agreement since it would no
longer have had the prospect of receiving the blocked assets in return for
payment of the private and government claims.224
In sum, vesting of blocked South Vietnamese government assets was
not a viable alternative to obtain compensation for private U.S. claims
against Vietnam. It would have unnecessarily legitimized Vietnam's claim
to ownership of the blocked assets. It might have prejudiced the ability to
obtain compensation for U.S. government property seized by Vietnam,
poisoned the atmosphere surrounding negotiations for a settlement, and
set a potentially damaging precedent for other nations considering the
United States as a site for investment or contemplating blocking U.S.
assets abroad in a crisis.
C. Vietnamese Claims Against the United States
During the negotiations between Vietnam and the United States over satis-
faction of U.S. claims for expropriated property, Vietnam surely raised the
issue of its own claims against the United States. Of course, Vietnam
demanded, as the successor state to South Vietnam, the release of $250
million in assets of the former South Vietnamese government blocked by
219. Id. at 544.
220. Id. at 545. As the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control testified:
The extent of foreign investment by the U.S. puts us in an extremely vulnerable
position abroad. The United States has staunchly maintained that foreign
property-whether U.S. property abroad or foreign property in the U.S.-can-
not be taken without prompt adequate and effective compensation. To vest, or
confiscate, [South Vietnamese] assets as proposed would set a damaging prece-
dential example for countries less dedicated than the United States to the pres-
ervation of property rights.
id
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 544-45.
224. Vietnam "paid" the U.S. government's claims by agreeing to turn over several
U.S.-built buildings to the United States for use as diplomatic offices. See Greenhouse,
supra note 9, at Al.
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the United States since 1975.22 Vietnam may also have sought guarantees
of compensation for substantial environmental damage which the United
States inflicted on South Vietnam by the widespread use of defoliants such
as Agent Orange 226 and by the sheer immensity of the conventional mili-
tary barrage inflicted on the countryside. 227
Conclusion
Under international law, American claimants who had property seized by
Vietnam after the fall of South Vietnam on April 29, 1975 were entitled to
full compensation, as valued by the FCSC, for their property. The pres-
ence of Vietnamese claims and the political and economic incentives sur-
rounding the normalization of relations between two former adversaries
could potentially have resulted in what has become common practice for
the United States, accepting a lump-sum settlement for less than the full
value of the claims. While courts have held that such lump-sum settle-
ments do not diminish the requirement for "fair" compensation for expro-
priated alien property, as that term has been defined in international
tribunal decisions, the United States nevertheless was correct in structur-
ing its normalization "package" to include formal payment of the fill
value of meritorious American claims. While this objective may have
required additional concessions on issues such as bilateral trade, Most
Favored Nation status, and future economic assistance, the United States,
225. See discussion, supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
226. Arthur H. Westing, The Environmental Aftermath of Warfare in Vietnam, 23 NAT.
RESoURCESJ. 365, 371 (1983). During the Vietnam War, a substantial quantity of dioxin
(2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodiben/o-para-dioxin, or TCDD) was disseminated into the South
Vietnamese environment as an impurity ofAgent Orange, the defoliant used most heav-
ily by the U.S. military. Dioxin is a highly potent human toxin and teratogen with
apparent mutagenic and carcinogenic effects on humans. A 1980 estimate of the
amount of dioxin disseminated was 170 kgs. on 1 million hectares of South Vietnam,
with 90% of that amount distributed between 1966 and 1969 and with the majority of it
applied to the provinces surrounding Saigon (now called Ho Chi Minh City). Id.
227. Id. at 374-75. One study concluded that approximately 1% (100,000 hectares)
of the entire South Vietnam forest area was obliterated (converted to craters) by 10
million tons of high explosive bombs and shells which created 10 to 15 million large
bomb craters, while another 40% (five million hectares) of the forest was subjected to
shrapnel which injured the trees thereby leading to fungal entry and decay and signifi-
cant tree mortality. Defoliant use is estimated to have caused 10-100% tree mortality on
12% (1.3 million hectares) of total South Vietnamese forest area, and clear cutting of
forests for tactical military purposes completely removed all trees from another 3%
(325,000 hectares) of South Vietnam's forest area.
Combining these estimates, and allowing for overlap in some instances, results in the
conclusion that 4% (417,000 hectares) of forest area was totally destroyed, while
another 50% (5.6 million hectares) was partially damaged. This destruction is esti-
mated to have destroyed 75 million square meters of timber-approximately 14% of
the standing merchantable timber crop in South Vietnam. Id.
Likewise, 41% (124,000 hectares) of the economically important coastal mangrove
habitat comprising 300,000 hectares in South Vietnam, was destroyed by chemical defo-
liants. Id. at 377. Additionally, large-scale systematic crop destruction as a weapon
against the Viet Cong is estimated to have affected 400,000 hectares of agricultural
lands resulting in the immediate destruction of more than 300,000 tons of food. Id. at
382.
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and the rest of the international community which espouse the full com-
pensation standard, will reap long-term benefits by enforcing a worthy
international law standard which promotes responsible settlement of pri-
vate individuals' claims against other nations.
